Christopher Tang
APEC needs trade certainty, not a Trump–Xi–Putin spectacle
As Trump, Xi and Putin prepare to meet in Shenzhen, China faces a bigger APEC test: delivering predictable trade rules, energy security and practical cooperation for the region’s smaller economies.
When leaders of APEC’s 21 member economies gather in Shenzhen this week, they will meet in a city that embodies what APEC was created to promote: open, fast-moving trade and technology-led economic growth. China, hosting for the third time after 2001 and 2014, has built its agenda around the motto ‘Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together’ and three pillars: openness, innovation and cooperation.
Yet the headlines reaching Shenzhen ahead of the delegations are about something else entirely: a politically weakened American president, a chip-industry scandal, a war in the Persian Gulf and another in Eastern Europe. The prevailing assumption is that the summit’s success will be judged by what happens among the biggest powers, above all when Trump meets Xi and Putin in a first-ever trilateral planned for 19 November. That view is incomplete and, for China, risky.
What matters more is whether Beijing can stop a regional economic forum from being hijacked by great-power drama. Get it right, and Shenzhen shows that a multipolar order can deliver. Get it wrong, and APEC becomes a photo backdrop.
Four distractions, one summit
First , the midterm election in the United States. American voters handed Democrats control of Congress on 3 November, and a CNBC post-election poll found the economy was their top concern, with nearly three in four calling the Iran war a crucial or major factor in their vote. A president weakened at home and likely to look abroad for welcome distractions, if not easy wins.
Second , the Nvidia affair. Jensen Huang resigned as chief executive after acknowledging a relationship with Alice Huang, a former Megaspeed executive whom US intelligence suspects of working for China’s Ministry of State Security, an allegation Beijing dismisses as a smear. Washington may see leverage here, but espionage claims are hard to prove quickly, and a summit is the wrong venue to litigate them.
Third , Iran. Since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been repeatedly disrupted, and by late October Brent crude remained more than 60 per cent above pre-war levels.
Fourth , Ukraine: US-brokered Russia-Ukraine talks resumed in Abu Dhabi on 10 November, the first since February, with the two sides still far apart.
What the headlines miss
Each crisis is real.
The danger for APEC is agenda capture: a grouping that accounts for roughly 60 per cent of world GDP reduced to a stage for three leaders. For Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Chile or Peru, a trilateral photo opportunity matters far less than whether tariffs, export licences and freight costs become predictable.
The incentives are also asymmetric.
On nuclear arms control, China holds a much smaller arsenal than the United States or Russia, and analysts note that Beijing has little reason to accept a three-way framework on those terms. On Ukraine, the real bargaining is between Washington and Moscow, while Kyiv will not be in the room in Shenzhen. A plan drafted without Ukraine is unlikely to hold. Whether on arms control or Ukraine, China has little to gain by taking the lead and much to lose by owning outcomes it cannot control.
Meanwhile, the clock that matters most to firms keeps ticking.
The US-China trade truce, which suspends Beijing’s sweeping October 2025 rare-earth controls and several US measures, has been extended only to 10 January 2027 . Every short-term extension carries a risk premium that companies across the region build into their sourcing and investment decisions.
Where China should focus
First, decline the bait on Jensen Huang. Engaging on the scandal only amplifies it. Beijing’s interest lies in steady, technical talks on chips, rare earths, and tariffs, not a public argument over intelligence claims.
Second, on Ukraine, be supportive but not central. China can endorse a negotiated settlement and leave Washington and Moscow to carry the burden of the details. It is not a priority for most APEC members, and it should not consume the summit.
Third, invest real diplomatic capital in de-escalation with Iran. This is where China’s interests and the region’s converge. According to the US Energy Information Administration, China, India, Japan and South Korea together take about 70 per cent of the oil shipped through Hormuz. A credible Chinese push for a ceasefire and safe passage would ease the energy inflation squeezing households from Manila to the American Midwest. Here, Washington and Beijing share an interest.
Finally, deliver concrete APEC public goods: a dated work plan toward the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, interoperable rules for cross-border data and AI, and supply-chain resilience programs for small and medium-sized enterprises. Most importantly, China should make its own trade tools more predictable, for instance by committing to transparent, rules-based licensing of critical minerals for APEC partners. In a multipolar order, leadership is measured by whether partners can plan around you.
Declarations in Shenzhen will not prove multipolarity. It will be proven if middle powers leave with less uncertainty than they arrived with. Vietnam takes over as host in 2027, and China’s year will be judged by what it hands over.
If Beijing keeps the summit focused on energy, trade and technology rules while others chase headlines, it will make a stronger case for a multipolar future than any communiqué.
The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of P&I.
