Ada Petriczko

November 12, 2026 08:14

Most European countries have comparable institutions, and disputes over appointments are hardly unusual. But the length and intensity of Poland’s struggle, complete with rival claims to judicial authority, street protests and presidential interventions, stands out.

On the evening of October 30, Polish President Karol Nawrocki was flying to Senegal when he ordered his plane to turn back over Spain. In Warsaw, a judge on the Constitutional Tribunal had just suspended the court's president, Bogdan Swieczkowski, and his deputy for a month. Shortly after landing, Nawrocki stormed into the court.

The judge, Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, had taken charge of the Tribunal as the member with the longest judicial career. She was elected to the Tribunal in 2026 by parliament, where the centrist ruling coalition holds a majority, but the right-wing Nawrocki had refused to administer the oath of office to her and four other judges.

Defending her move, she argued that the court had become so politicised it had stopped functioning. “In 2026, Bogdan Swieczkowski did not hear or rule on a single constitutional complaint filed by a citizen. The only rulings he issued concerned cases referred by the president,” Korwin-Piotrowska said in a video posted on the Constitutional Tribunal’s website a week later.

Elsewhere , she mentioned more than 1,000 cases that remain pending before the court, with some delays dating back 12 years. "That will change. We will deal with cases properly, one by one," she pledged.

The opposition, particularly the populist-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, denounced the move as a “coup”. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government portrayed it as another step towards restoring the rule of law.

It was the latest round in a decade-long fight that has drawn in the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, all of which have questioned how the Tribunal is composed.

Most EU countries have a similar court; few treat it as a spectator sport. In a 2025 study of awareness of judicial independence in Germany, Poland, Hungary and the US, nearly half of German respondents said they were not very aware of their Federal Constitutional Court, despite its considerable power, compared with more than 80 per cent of Poles who said they were somewhat or very aware of theirs.

“I know this is shocking to people from other countries,” Anna Wojcik, a constitutional law researcher and journalist, tells BIRN. “I can’t think of another example of such a fierce political battle over a Constitutional Tribunal. Even in Hungary, disputes over the court have been more technical and legal in nature, rather than spilling into protests outside its doors.”

Part of the explanation lies in what the court can do in the very polarised politics of Poland: being able to rule on whether laws are compatible with the constitution, it is one of the few institutions able to overrule a parliamentary majority. Whoever controls it, or can stop it working, escapes one of the main checks on their power. Furthermore, it became central to the culture wars being fought in the country when it was the tool used by the previous PiS government in 2020 to further restrict abortion rights .

Anna Materska-Sosnowska, a political scientist at the University of Warsaw, sees two things converging in the current crisis: the long erosion of constitutional review, and everyday party rivalry.

“Electoral calculations matter, but reducing the whole conflict to a fight for votes obscures what is really at stake: who can effectively limit political power, and on what terms,” she tells BIRN.

Wojcik puts it more bluntly. “I think there is a strong sense in Polish politics of ‘it’s our turn now’ – a majoritarian view of democracy,” she says. “Ultimately, it’s all about power.”

For much of Poland’s post-communist history, the Constitutional Tribunal operated without attracting anything like today’s political attention. Its independence was not beyond dispute, but its authority was broadly recognised, even as Polish politics remained fiercely partisan.

That began to unravel in 2015. Shortly before losing power, the centrist Civic Platform (PO) government attempted to fill more seats on the Tribunal than it was entitled to. The court ruled that two of the five appointments were unconstitutional, and the move never went ahead. Then PiS won that autumn’s election, a party, in Wojcik’s words, with “a tendency to disregard procedures, apply the rules selectively and put political goals above the law” – a characteristic which stands at odds with the party’s name: Law and Justice.

The new ruling majority installed its own judges in seats that had already been filled, which Wojcik says led to the breakdown of Poland’s constitutional order. Over the following eight years, PiS reshaped the court through contested appointments and changes to its leadership and procedures, prompting criticism from European institutions and undermining confidence in its independence.

“Responsibility for this crisis is not equally shared,” Materska-Sosnowska says. “PiS’s actions since 2015 have undermined the Tribunal’s independence and public trust in its rulings.”

Wojcik believes the dispute grew so large because PiS wanted the Tribunal under its control, and fast. Unsure of a second term, the party went all in during its first years in power.

Polarisation has kept the fight going ever since. “Both parties thrive on that polarisation,” she says. “Many voters may dislike it, but politically, it still pays off.”

When Tusk’s coalition took office in December 2023, promising to restore judicial independence, it inherited a court whose legitimacy it and others disputed. Its attempts to reverse the damage have since run into resistance from PiS-appointed judges and, more recently, President Nawrocki, a PiS ally.

This year, Nawrocki refused to administer the oath of office to five judges elected by the current parliament, including Korwin-Piotrowska. The judges took their oaths at a parliamentary ceremony instead, but the Tribunal’s leadership refused to recognise them. European legal bodies have supported the position that the president cannot obstruct the appointment of duly elected judges.

The result was a remarkable spectacle: competing groups of judges claiming authority over the same court, while politicians accused one another of attacking the constitution.

What each side wants

Each side is using the fight to project an image.

“Civic Coalition’s core voters finally see the government taking action, as promised,” Wojcik says. “Many of them want to see the institutions that PiS took over and dismantled brought back under control, and they are often less concerned with legal niceties than lawyers or constitutional experts.”

But such displays of resolve can be tricky. The coalition came to power pledging to restore respect for constitutional procedures. The more contentious its methods, the easier it becomes for opponents to portray its actions as another attempt to capture the judiciary.

“The risk is that actions presented as corrective measures will be perceived as yet another attempt to subordinate the institution to the current parliamentary majority,” Materska-Sosnowska says.

For PiS and Nawrocki, the conflict serves a different political purpose. They have cast the government’s efforts to overhaul state institutions as a “coup”, a narrative promoted by right-wing media including TV Republika since Tusk returned to power. Nawrocki’s dramatic return from his interrupted state visit fitted neatly into that confrontation.

“The president clearly wanted to project a macho, strongman image by turning his plane around and storming into the Tribunal,” Wojcik says. “Some of his voters may like it, but others may see it as behaviour unbecoming of a president.”

The danger is that the court becomes less an independent arbiter than another institution through which Poland’s two dominant political camps demonstrate their strength.

The confrontation comes at the onset of Poland’s election cycle – the next parliamentary election will be held in the autumn of 2027 – offering both camps an issue around which to rally their supporters. Whether it will matter to voters by election day remains uncertain.

“The battle over the judiciary has never been a major election issue,” Wojcik says. “Right now, it generates plenty of emotion and political spectacle, but the election is still a year away.”

Who will keep the politicians in check?

For all the political drama, the Constitutional Tribunal has a much greater impact on ordinary people’s lives than they might realise. When functioning properly, it can strike down laws that violate the constitution, while individuals can challenge the constitutionality of laws used to decide their cases. Its rulings have addressed matters ranging from pensions to freedom of speech and assembly.

“Before 2016, the Tribunal has done a great deal to strengthen democratic principles and human rights in Poland,” Wójcik said. “A functionally independent Tribunal could still play that role today and in the future.”

Instead, the court has spent much of the past decade embroiled in disputes over its own legitimacy. Its caseload has declined, while the controversy surrounding its judgments has eroded confidence in its authority.

For now, the Tribunal’s future remains uncertain, with rival groups of judges claiming authority over the institution. One proposed way out is a constitutional “reset”, backed by politicians from the left-wing Razem party to the far-right Confederation, which would replace the sitting judges with a new bench chosen through a cross-party agreement. But such a move would require a constitutional amendment and therefore broad political support, which currently appears elusive.

While the immediate confrontation may be resolved through political negotiations or another shift in power, restoring the court’s credibility will be far more difficult.

For Materska-Sosnowska, the most serious long-term consequence is the growing perception that every state institution belongs to one political camp or another. If citizens come to believe that the authority of a judgment depends on who issued it and whose interests it serves, the law itself loses its ability to settle disputes.

That raises a difficult question for Tusk’s coalition: can the rule of law be restored through methods whose legality are themselves contested?

“The ultimate test will be whether this crisis produces a Tribunal capable of holding even those who rebuilt it to account,” Materska-Sosnowska says. “That is what distinguishes restoring an independent institution from taking control of it.”

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