Pavlina Janebova and Vit Dostal

November 5, 2026 07:50

Czechia’s foreign policy could be labelled ‘Euro-Atlanticism by inertia’ – aligned with the West by following the current momentum, without active strategy or particular enthusiasm.

Public opinion polls taken between 2021 and 2025 consistently showed that more than half the Czech population, choosing between the country’s geopolitical orientation towards the West or East, would prefer to stay somewhere in the middle. The current Czech government appears to be catering to those voters, rising geopolitical tensions notwithstanding.

Czechia's three-party coalition government, in office since late 2025, is led by Andrej Babis’s ANO party – a cofounder of the radical-right Patriots for Europe grouping in the European Parliament. Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), one of the junior partners in the coalition, is a “traditional” far-right party – anti-immigration, xenophobic, anti-EU and anti-NATO – operationalizing these general sentiments into strongly opposing any support for Ukraine. The third partner, Motorists for Themselves – the intellectual heirs of the former president, prime minister and father of Czech Euroscepticism Vaclav Klaus – would very much like to position themselves as the closest thing there is to a MAGA movement in any European government.

When it comes to external policies – foreign as well as European – there are two main general features that all three parties share. First, in all their programs there is some (albeit different) level of Euroscepticism to be found. And second, crucially, is that domestic political convenience dictates external actions.

Expectations vs reality

Before and immediately after the 2025 general election, concerns were raised that a government including the far right (or far left, which ultimately didn’t win enough votes to make it into the Chamber of Deputies) means the country would move further away from the unequivocally pro-Western foreign policy of the previous government of Petr Fiala.

While the idea of an outright Viktor Orban-style turn towards Russia was never seriously entertained, major disruption to how Czech foreign policy is carried out and what its priorities are had been a clear ambition of both the SPD and Motorists during the election campaign.

This scenario has, to a large extent, played out. The Motorists, whose chairman Petr Macinka has taken the reins at the Foreign Ministry, indulge in culture-war politics, including personnel reorganisations and effectively defunding human rights and democratisation support programs – a key pillar of the post-1993 Czech foreign policy, alongside development aid and humanitarian policies in general. The party has also escalated its conflict with the more liberal President Petr Pavel.

Meanwhile, the SPD’s influence on the substance of actual policies has been limited, though this has not prevented them from spreading anti-Ukrainian vitriol through public channels and trying to prevent any assistance from getting to Ukraine.

Babis’s catch-all ANO caters to a lukewarm centrism, keeping the voter base happy by avoiding costly international commitments, passively enabling some of the radical ideological excesses of its junior partners as the necessary price of keeping the coalition alive.

These dynamics – the different foreign policy preferences of the coalition partners, except for the shared Euroscepticism; the shared low priority attached to external affairs; and the catch-all ANO at the steering wheel – is resulting in what could be best described as a “Euro-Atlanticism by inertia”. Czechia is aligned with the West by following the current momentum, without active strategy or particular enthusiasm. The government embraces zero-cost postures while hesitating or outright refusing to expend real resources or political capital.

Membership of the EU and NATO is considered non-negotiable and questioning it is verboten (despite the SPD’s preferences). At the same time, the percentage of GDP spent by Czechia on defence is among the lowest among the alliance members, with no ambition for a substantive increase. The prime minister’s financial conflicts of interest have the potential to sour relations between Prague and EU institutions, together with potential rule-of-law breaches (an anti-NGO law, the independence of the public service media , and autonomy of civil servants).

The government’s attitude to Ukraine is not outright frosty, rather lukewarm. Despite the SPD’s rhetoric, the government as a whole does not challenge the designation of Russia as the aggressor in the war. A return to buying Russian energy sources is not, at the moment, on the table. Ukraine’s defence and its importance for Czechia has not been actively emphasised as a key issue, however. Aid has been reduced as part of the general cuts mentioned above. The ammunition initiative of the previous government has remained, though Czechia does not contribute any funds. It also refused to participate in the EU-wide loan to Ukraine at the end of 2025, and is likely to do so again for another 45-billion-euro support package currently being negotiated for the end of this year. This ambivalent approach is likely to stay for the rest of the coalition’s term in office.

The announced paradigmatic shift of Czech foreign policy from a focus on promoting values towards one of pragmatism, embodied by “economic diplomacy”, is a general idea rather than a thought-through strategy, plan or clear goal. Furthermore, pure economic diplomacy makes little sense in an era of geopolitical fragmentation and trade securitisation. Thinking about one’s own security without considering values is, in turn, preposterous.

An issue where the coalition’s stance is, on the other hand, very clear – and remarkably similar to that of its predecessor – is the strong bilateral relationship with Israel, which is rather a non-issue in the Czech political sphere and, again, bears no significant political cost.

Similarly, cooperation between the Visegrad Group (V4) of countries has been portrayed as a priority, but so far remains stuck at the rhetorical level, without any real successes (except for a broad agreement on the EU’s next multi-year budget or on migration). The future success of a revived V4 is by no means guaranteed, given the differences in threat perceptions and strategic outlooks among the four countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), as well as the impact of domestic election cycles.

The realisation that it is not enough to define national interests only in vague terms and to not bother sketching out and executing a comprehensive strategy for a foreign policy still escapes the Czech government. As does the acknowledgement that tending carefully to international alliances and commitments, instead of free-riding or muddling through, is not optional in the current international climate, which in the future might not be as favourable to small and medium-sized states.

If Czechia continues to act like this, it puts its relationships with partners and allies at stake. But why should anyone care, besides the Czech citizens who, after all, elected their own government?

Czechia’s European and NATO allies cannot simply ignore the country’s lack of strategic direction, especially given that it occupies a critical transit route and geopolitical position close to the West’s eastern flank. A foreign and security policy built around doing the bare minimum risks undermining Czechia’s credibility as a reliable partner in collective defence.

Furthermore, it degrades alliance cohesion: when partners invest heavily in ensuring common security and burden-sharing, a member’s ambiguity weakens the entire bloc’s credibility and leaves the alliance vulnerable at its weakest link. In the previous 16 years, it was Orban’s Hungary that, over time, deliberately put itself in such a position. To be clear, Czech foreign policy is far from Orban’s deliberate multi-vector hedging. Hungary sabotaged Western strategy out of political calculation; Czechia is at the risk of degrading it out of strategic laziness and a domestic demand for cost-free populism.

But for NATO and the EU, the end result could be functionally identical: a key ally becomes an unreliable, unpredictable spectator just when collective resolve matters most.

Pavlína Janebová is Research Director and Vít Dostál is Executive Director of the Association for International Affairs (AMO) (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky), a leading Czech independent foreign policy think tank based in Prague.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.

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